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Summary 
 
Since the Treaty of Lisbon1 on the reform of the European Union 
was brought into action on December 1, 2009, a new 
transformation stage has begun in the history of united Europe. 
The new fundamental document is meant to make the EU more 
efficient, democratic and transparent, as well as strengthen the 
integration structure’s positions in international relations. For 
Belarus, the important question is in what way the Lisbon 
innovations are going to influence the practices of the EU policy 
towards East European countries and the EU – Belarus relations.  
 
Focus Change 
 
Affected by euphoria caused by the completion of the long-drawn-out ratification of the 
Lisbon Treaty, a lot of politicians and commentators both in the EU and Belarus have 
aired an opinion that the institutional and procedural reforms provided by the new treaty 
will definitely result in a rapid and undeniable optimization of decision-making in the EU 
foreign policy. They point out that transition to the new administration system will help 
remove ‘technical’ barriers that until recently prevented the EU from becoming a full-
fledged actor in international relations and a powerful center in the today’s multi-polar 
structure of international politics. Prognoses are being made that in the context of the EU 
– Belarus relations it will be easier for united Europe to develop a more coherent and 
consistent approach under the new conditions. 
 
However, basing on the analysis of the Lisbon Treaty, its ratification procedure and 
appointments of the first President of the EU Council and the High Representative of the 
EU for Foreign Affairs and Security (henceforth referred to as the High Representative) 
with extended functions, it can be argued that most of the expectations are not going to 
come true automatically, by the mere fact of the treaty having been brought into action. 
While considering the EU policy towards Belarus, we seem to be certain of two changes 
only. 
 
Firstly, the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty by the last one of the 27 EU member states 
has drawn the line under the search for an optimal transformation model that has been 
going on for years. The institutional and procedural status quo, which was evidently 
                                               
1 The full official title is the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
establishing the European Community   
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inadequate for the EU-27 format, the failure of the European Constitution and problems 
with authorizing the Lisbon package itself made all the EU institutions concentrate their 
attention and focus their efforts on the major task of putting an end to the prolonged 
situation in which nothing was decided about the treaty. If the Lisbon Treaty had been 
turned down in a referendum in Ireland for the second time or if Germany, Poland and 
the Czech Republic had failed to ratify it, that would have made the prospect of a major 
systemic crisis in the EU absolutely possible. In this case, according to a widespread 
expert opinion, the propositions of the Lisbon Treaty would have had to be buried for 
quite a time. Even the states that think most positive of increasing European integration 
would hardly have been enthusiastic enough to initiate yet another procedure of 
reconsidering proposals to reform the EU.2 On a practical level, that would entail, among 
other things, a total freeze on the prospects of further EU enlargement for a very long 
time. This would send a very clear message within the European Neighborhood Policy. 
 
That the new fundamental agreement has been brought into action is a relief for the 
political elites of the EU member states. The ‘European bicycle’ keeps on going. Any 
further changes in the fundamental EU legislation will not be on the agenda for the 
nearest decade. In its turn, it allows the updated EU institutions to concentrate on the 
content of multiple political, economic and social changes. The shift in focus may 
certainly have an impact on, among other things, the energy and intensiveness with 
which united Europe pursues its policies in the fields that are of considerable importance 
to Belarus, such as the European Neighborhood in general and the Eastern Partnership in 
particular, the general strategy on Belarus and the relations with Russia. However, it 
should be remembered that this kind of focus shift is only one of many prerequisites for 
an essential qualitative change.  
 
Secondly, the shift from rotational EU chairmanship to the institutions of the President of 
the EU Council and the High Representative will be of tangible practical importance to 
Belarus. (The High Representative will have the European External Action Service at his 
disposal with quite impressive staff of up to more than 5000.) What this innovation 
means is that the ‘neighboring chair states’ factor will be gone. In other words, it will put 
an end to the practice of prioritizing the East European dimension on the EU agenda 
through six months’ chairmanship of member states with their specific invested interests 
in the region, such as Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, as well as Estonia, Germany, Sweden, 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia. At the same time, the factor of ‘impartial chair states’ 
will also be gone.  
 
We have yet to witness the establishment of the EU’s new diplomatic service. As a result 
we will see what material and human resources will be allocated to the East European 
dimension of the EU’s joint foreign policy. In all probability, resource distribution within 
the new foreign policy institution and its programs will reflect the existing tacit balance of 
priorities between the East European and Mediterranean dimensions of the European 
Neighborhood Policy. In financial terms, the balance (or lack of it, for that matter) is 
established at a ratio of 1/3 (for the East European dimension) to 2/3 (for the 
Mediterranean dimension).  
 
Uncertain Certainty 
 
Most of the expected changes in the EU – Belarus relations, which analysts tend to link to 
the Lisbon Treaty being brought into action, are definitely not automatic or unambiguous. 
In the long term they could of course become a reality. However, there are a lot of 
prerequisites.  
 
                                               
2 Brady, H. Last Chance for Lisbon: Ireland’s EU Referendum. – 
http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/bn_lisbon_22sept09.pdf. 
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Thus, on the one hand, the beginning of the ‘Lisbon reforms’, particularly the expansion 
of the qualified majority vote practice in the EU Council, the establishment of the joint 
European diplomatic service, the appointment of the first President of the EU Council and 
the increased role of the European Parliament can be viewed as evidence supporting the 
case of the federalist theory of European integration. Within this theory, it would only be 
logical to expect such practical outcome as turning the common EU foreign policy and 
security from mainly a virtual concept into a full-fledged everyday reality. For the EU’s 
policies on Belarus that would mean an unequivocal shift towards a more centralized 
decision-making. In its turn, this would give grounds to think in theory that now that the 
new fundamental document has been brought into action, the EU’s position on Belarus 
and its methods would become more effective and all-embracing. In that case official 
Minsk would actually lose all the chances of playing on contradictions within the European 
Union or lobbying its interests through separate agreements with individual member 
states. 
 
On the other hand, the long-drawn ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and the appointments 
to the new common European positions show that the conflict between the tendencies to 
strengthen the supranational factor on the one hand and to preserve political domination 
of national governments on the other, which has always been typical of the European 
integration, is still present, despite the adoption of the new EU legislation. This can be 
clearly illustrated by lots of articles in the leading European media and on information 
agencies’ websites following the announcement of the new appointees’ names. ‘The 
appointments highlight the European Union's reluctance to choose a high-profile 
president who can see eye-to-eye with other world leaders,’ says EurActiv.com.3, ‘They 
[Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel] are content for the new president to do the EU's 
internal business and for the foreign policy representative to work quietly away, relying 
more on the EU's combined power and less on a loud voice,’ says BBC NEWS CHANNEL.4 
‘Ultimately, the two new leaders are a sign of just how little the EU is valued in Europe's 
capitals,’ says SPIEGEL ONLINE.5 
 
Thus, the question of where and at what speed the ‘European integration bicycle’ is 
moving and it stops still remains a theoretical puzzle. However, the appointment of the 
new EU top representatives equivocally proves that in the near future foreign policy will 
still be the domain of national governments. Besides, this is unambiguously stated in the 
fundamental treaty in its present form. The foreign policy mandate of both the High 
Representative and the President of the EU Council is limited to representing the EU’s 
interests on the basis of decisions taken by the European Council and the Council of 
Foreign Ministers within procedures that actually always require a unanimous vote.  
 
At the same time, it would be a mistake to ignore the prospects of the High 
Representative’s increased coordinating role on the whole range of foreign policy and 
security issues. The merger of the positions of the old-style High Representative and the 
EU External Relations and Neighborhood Policy Commissioner was aimed at bringing 
together the ‘political authority’ of the former and the resources the latter had at their 
disposal. For this reason, even though such limitation as the required unanimous vote of 
the Council persists, the new High Representative will enjoy increased operative mobility 
within the content framework determined by the decision of the EU Council. In this 
respect, such an innovation as modified EU delegations abroad is also worth mentioning. 
Firstly, it has a symbolic meaning: previously called delegations of the European 
Commission, they have now acquired a more ‘authoritative’ title of the EU delegations. 
                                               
3 EU elects discrete, consensual leaders. – http://www.euractiv.com/en/future-eu/eu-elects-discrete-
consensual-leaders/article-187509  
4 Reynolds, P. EU Foreign Head Dismisses Critics. – http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/8370191.stm. 
5 Volkey, C. Europe Chooses Nobodies. – http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,662357,00.html. 
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Secondly, it also has practical significance: now that the institution of rotational 
chairmanship in the field of the EU’s foreign policy has been simplified, it is the EU 
delegations that are entrusted with representing the EU’s coordinated positions in third 
countries on a permanent basis. Consequently, the role and importance of this mission to 
Belarus will clearly grow as compared to the current role of the Office of the European 
Commission. 
 
It can be expected that in the future a lot of things in the EU’s new diplomatic structure 
will be determined by personal and professional characteristics of people placed at the 
core of making and implementing decisions. What matters here is not only the 
personalities of the President of the European Council, the High Representative and key 
officials of the External Action Service. It is not fully clear how exactly ‘diplomatic 
workload’ will be distributed within the European Commission. As is stressed in its press-
releases, a number of European Commissioners in President Jose Manuel Barroso’s new 
team will have to work in close collaboration with the High Representative,6 who is also 
the Vice President of the European Commission. What is of particular interest to Belarus 
is the new position of the Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy Commissioner. 
If approved by the European Parliament, Czech representative Štefan Füle is going to 
take this post. The ‘diplomatic block’ also includes Commissioners on International 
Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response, as well as the Commissioner on 
Development.  
 
Thus, according to the authors of The Value of Power, The Power of Values: A Call for an 
EU Grand Strategy report, the Lisbon Treaty will provide the EU with more and better 
tools – a grand strategy must clarify, when and how to use them.7 Time will show 
whether the European Union will be able to develop such a Grand Strategy and when 
exactly it will happen. 
 
Conclusions 
 
1. That the Lisbon Treaty has been brought into action is of great symbolic 
importance, demonstrating that the ‘European integration bicycle’ keeps moving. 
However, on the practical level we can at present be certain of only a few 
changes brought about by the ‘Lisbon epoch’ that are important in the 
context of the EU – Belarus relations. 
2. The first important change is the shift of focus of the EU institutions and officials’ 
attention and organizational efforts from drawing up, approving and ratifying a Statute 
to the necessity to fill various changes in the EU policies with real content. This 
refers to both the European Neighborhood Policy as a whole and the EaP initiative in 
particular, including the EU – Belarus and EU – Russia relations.  
3. Now that the institutions of the President of the European Council and the High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (with the External Action 
Service and EU delegations as their backbone) have substituted for rotational 
chairmanship, both the Belarusian government and the opposition 
structures and civil society have lost the opportunity to promote their 
interests through actively influencing EU chair states that have their 
invested interests in Eastern Europe. It can be expected that in the post-Lisbon 
EU, the degree of prioritizing East European states in the EU’s joint foreign policy 
will correspond to the current tacit East European – Mediterranean priority rate.  
                                               
6 President Barroso Unveils His New Team. – 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1837 
7 Egmont Paper 33 – The Value of Power, The Power of Values: A Call for an EU Grand Strategy. – 
http://www.egmontinstitute.be/paperegm/ep33.pdf 
